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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900330-CA 
v. : 
Priority No. 2 
THOMAS W. SCHNOOR, : 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of 
forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-501 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, 
presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. (a) Did the prosecution breach a duty to clarify an 
allegedly false impression arising from defendant's cross-
examination of one of the State's witnesses? This Court must 
determine whether false testimony or a false impression existed 
below and will not disturb the conviction absent "a reasonable 
likelihood the false impression . • • could have affected the 
judgment of the jury." Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690-91 
(Utah 1981); see also State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 789 (Utah 
1984); State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980), 
(b) Was the allegedly false impression improperly 
fostered by the giving of jury instruction number 7 relating to 
defendant's status as a party to the offense? No standard of 
review is presented for this issue because defendant failed to 
preserve the issue for appellate review. 
(c) In the alternative, was defendant denied effective 
assistance of trial counsel due to counsel's failure to 1) enter 
into the trial record evidence establishing the State's verbal 
commitment made at the preliminary hearing, and 2) make a record 
of objections to jury instructions made at unrecorded bench 
conferences at trial? Because this issue was not raised at the 
district court, there is no order to review. Instead, this Court 
must determine whether counsel's performance was deficient and, 
if so, whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant 
under the test set forth in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986). 
2. Did the prosecutor's statements during trial and in 
closing argument deny defendant a fair trial? This Court may 
reverse a conviction only if the prosecutor's statements are 
improper and prejudicial. State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 786 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990)• When reviewing an 
allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must determine 
whether counsel's statements "call[ed] to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they could not properly consider in 
determining their verdict", and whether the error was 
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"substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that without the error the result would have been more 
favorable for the defendant-" Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925; see 
also Harrison, 805 P.2d at 786; State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 
(Utah App. 1990); State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 
422, 426 (1973). 
3. Did the prosecutor's limited inquiry into 
defendant's opinion as to the veracity of another witness at 
trial prejudice defendant? Although the questions may be deemed 
improper, see State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah 
April 7, 1992), this Court should not disturb the conviction 
unless it determines that there is "a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result" absent the questioning. State v. Tuttle, 
780 P.2d 1203, 1213 n.l (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018, 
110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); Utah R. Evid. 103; Utah R. Crim. P. 30. 
4. Is defendant entitled to reversal of his conviction 
based on the aggregate of the alleged errors if none of the 
individual allegations of error warrant reversal? This Court 
will not apply the cumulative error doctrine unless it finds that 
multiple, substantial errors were committed below. State v. 
Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990): 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose 
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
• • • 
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(b) Makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, 
or utters any writing so that the writing or 
the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have 
been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the 
case, or to be a copy of an original when no 
such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing"includes 
printing or any other method of recording information, 
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, 
right, privilege, or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if 
the writing is or purports to be: 
• • • 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 
or more . . . . 
The text of other relevant constitutional, statutory, 
or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 21, 1990, defendant Thomas W. Schnoor was 
charged with forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. 6).1 Schnoor pled not 
guilty (R. 16), and trial was set for May 1, 1990 (R. 16). The 
jury found Schnoor guilty as charged (R. 27; Tr. at 219-20), and 
1
 Citations herein to the record on appeal are as follows: 
Court's Record R. (page) 
Preliminary Hearing Transcript P.H. at (page) 
Trial Transcript Tr. at (page). 
Pages 48 through 53 of the trial transcript are out of order and 
may be found between pages 92 and 93 in the transcript. 
the court sentenced him to serve an indeterminate term of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 76, 77). Schnoor 
filed his notice of appeal on the day of sentencing (R. 78). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During January, 1990, defendant Thomas W. Schnoor 
resided with his ex-wife and their two children in an apartment 
in Salt Lake City (Tr. at 158-60, 167). He was also romantically 
involved with the mother of Brent and Brenda Lindsey, sixteen-
year-old fraternal twins (Tr. at 18, 40, 65-66, 157-58). Early 
on January 25, 1990, defendant called Brent, asked him if he 
wanted to earn $ 50.00, and told him he could not tell anybody 
what he was going to do (Tr. at 19-21). Brent agreed and 
defendant arranged to pick him up at work that afternoon (Tr. at 
21). Around 2:00 p.m., defendant picked up Brenda so she could 
show him where Brent worked, and the two picked up Brent (Tr. at 
19, 21, 67-70). Defendant gave Brent a paycheck drawn on the 
account of defendant's employer, Huish Detergents, and made 
payable to Robert B. Saupe (Tr. at 22-24, 147-48, 157; State's 
Exhibit 1). Defendant directed Brent to memorize the name so he 
could try to cash the check (Tr. at 22-26, 72). The trio went to 
Mike's Pawn, a pawn shop frequented by defendant and owned by 
Jack Lords (Tr. at 26, 124, 152, 169). Defendant repurchased his 
television and took it to his car while Brent attempted to cash 
the check at another counter (Tr. at 26-27, 51-55, 153, 169-71). 
When Lords required an indorsement on the check, Brent, who 
suffers a learning disability, misspelled "Saupe" (Tr. at 26-27, 
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43, 48-51, 53-54). Lords refused to cash the check, and Brent 
followed defendant out of the shop (Tr. at 26-27, 53-54, 73-74). 
Defendant drove the Lindseys to their apartment and 
made two phone calls, each time asking if the establishment on 
the other end cashed checks (Tr. at 28-33, 75-77, 153-54, 178-
81). He asked Brenda to get him a pair of scissors which he used 
to cut off the end of the check on which the misspelled 
indorsement appeared (Tr. at 33-34, 56-57, 75-79). He then drove 
Brent and Brenda to "Cash-A-Check", stopping across the street to 
let Brent out (Tr. at 34-35, 55, 79). Defendant gave Brent the 
check, told him what to do, and admonished him not to mention 
defendant's name, his description, or where he was parked should 
there be a problem (Tr. at 35-36, 79-80). Because Brent had no 
identification, the store's manager required that he fill out an 
information sheet (Tr. at 36-37, 109). He again misspelled the 
name of the payee, provided some general information, and left 
the majority of the document blank (Tr. at 110-11; State's 
Exhibit 2). The manager went to the back room, phoned Huish 
Detergents for verification, spoke with Robert Saupe, discovered 
that the check had been reported missing, and then called the 
police, who arrived minutes later and arrested Brent (Tr. at 37, 
111, 114, 119-20). Defendant and Brenda drove away when the 
police arrived (Tr. at 80). 
6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Brent Lindsey's responses to defendant's inquiries 
concerning an alleged grant of immunity were accurate, were fully 
supported by the preliminary hearing transcript, and were not 
otherwise proven to be false. Further, the exchange created no 
false impression affecting the jury's credibility determination. 
Accordingly, the State had no duty to "correct" the accurate 
testimony, and defense counsel's failure to introduce the 
preliminary hearing testimony to clarify the impression did not 
constitute deficient performance. Alternatively, any false 
impression which may have been generated by the exchange was 
invited by defendant and was not reasonably likely to have 
affected the jury's judgment. Any possible prejudice stemming 
from the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's examination 
of Brent was adequately mitigated by the court's ruling and 
subsequent instruction to the jury. The prosecutor's statements 
in his closing remarks to the jury were within the scope of 
proper closing argument and did not foster the allegedly false 
impression. Any objection to instruction number 7 was waived 
below. Defendant's assertion that the impression affected the 
jury's judgment by impacting on its credibility assessment is 
unpersuasive given the evidence at trial relating to credibility 
and guilt together with the reasonable inference therefrom 
contrary to the impression challenged on appeal and affirmatively 
argued by defendant to the jury. Accordingly, defense counsel's 
failure to correct the allegedly false impression was not so 
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prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict. 
Defendant failed to preserve all but one of his 
challenges to the prosecutor's closing remarks by registering no 
objections, registering inadequate objections, or failing to 
request clarifying instructions below. Even on the merits, none 
of the prosecutor's remarks warrant reversal of defendant's 
conviction because he did not bring to the jury's attention 
matters which they could not consider in reaching their decision, 
and defendant suffered no prejudice in light of the circumstances 
and the evidence in this case. 
Defendant waived appellate review of the prosecutor's 
initial question to him at trial regarding the veracity of 
another witness, and any impropriety in the remaining questions 
was harmless where the actions of both the court and defendant 
mitigated any potential prejudice. 
The aggregate of the alleged errors does not warrant 
reversal of defendant's conviction because defendant waived most 
of the alleged errors below, and any remaining error constitutes 
at most harmless error. Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine 




THE CHALLENGED TESTIMONY WAS TRUE AND 
FOSTERED NO FALSE IMPRESSION; ALTERNATIVELY, 
EVEN IF A FALSE IMPRESSION WAS GENERATED BY 
THE EXCHANGE, IT DID NOT AFFECT THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE JURY AND, HENCE, DOES NOT WARRANT 
REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTION 
Defendant contends that Brent Lindsey, the State's 
first witness at trial, gave false testimony in response to 
defendant's cross-examination. He asserts that the testimony 
generated a false impression which was fostered by jury 
instruction number 7, the prosecutor's failure to correct the 
testimony, and the prosecutor's alleged misconduct in actively 
arguing the claimed impression in his closing remarks. Defendant 
contends that the false impression prejudicially tainted the 
credibility determination underlying the verdict, thereby 
requiring reversal of his conviction. In the alternative, he 
contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
make the preliminary hearing events and his objections to 
instruction number 7 below part of the trial record (Brief of 
Appellant at 14-15). However, reversal is not warranted because 
the challenged testimony at trial was fully consistent with that 
rendered at the preliminary hearing, it did not foster any false 
impression, and there is no reasonable likelihood that it 
affected the jury's judgment. 
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A. The Challenged Trial Testimony was True and Fostered no False 
Impression 
Defendant contends that Brent gave "incorrect 
testimony" which fostered a false impression "that Brent was 
testifying in spite of the effect that it may have on his own 
trial" (Brief of Appellant at 12). However, Brent's responses to 
defendant's cross-examination regarding immunity were truthful 
and accurate and generated no false impression. 
The knowing use of false evidence to obtain a 
conviction is a violation of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 
1981).2 If false testimony is given or a false impression is 
generated and the State knows it to be false, the State has a 
duty to correct it, whether or not it was solicited by the State. 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 789 (Utah 1984) (citing Walker, 
624 P.2d at 690). However, the duty arises only upon the State's 
knowing use of false evidence. Shabata, 678 P.2d at 789; Walker, 
624 P.2d at 690-91. Because the challenged testimony in this 
case is not false and did not generate a false impression, the 
State had no duty to act. 
The "immunity" which defendant claims was granted by 
the State to Brent at the preliminary hearing was a verbal 
2
 Although he claims a violation of both the state and federal 
constitutions (Brief of Appellant at 11), defendant claims no 
broader protection under the state constitution and provides no 
separate analysis for the state claim. Hence, this court need not 
conduct a separate analysis under the state constitution. State v. 
Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 n.2 (Utah 1991); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 
803, 805-06 (Utah 1986). 
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"commitment" to not file future charges against Brent and was not 
given to obtain Brent's testimony. The commitment was elicited 
by the preliminary hearing court in response to defendant's 
voiced concerns: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINDSTAFF]: Your Honor, there-
there 's one matter I might address the Court on. It's 
my—looking at the police report, it appears that Mr. 
Lindsey is identified as a suspect and there's been a 
juvenile referral on this particular case. And I don't 
think that it's appropriate that—that we—I give him 
legal advice, or even the Court; but if he testifies, 
what he says may incriminate himself. 
(P.H. at 3). Both the court and the prosecutor questioned Brent 
to determine the extent of his involvement with the Juvenile 
Court. Defense counsel then conducted his voir dire of the 
witness, closing his questioning with the following: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. Have you been granted 
immunity— 
[BRENT LINDSEY]. No. 
Q. —from charges? You have no written—nothing 
in writing or no promises made that you wouldn't be 
charged in the future? 
A. No. 
THE COURT: I don't see any problem in going ahead 
with this witness at this point. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Two problems, one is— 
obviously, we can't give him advice but—we're not his 
attorney, but potentially, looking at the — 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask, is it the intention 
of the State to charge this defendant in Juvenile 
Court? 
[PROSECUTOR VERHOEF]: It's my understanding, 
Detective Mossier has just informed me that the charges 
were once filed in Juvenile Court but have been 
dismissed; isn't that right? 
11 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. And are you making a commitment 
now on behalf of the State that you're not going to 
file charges against the defendant in Juvenile Court 
based on this incident? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, I will, your Honor. For the 
record, the State will not charge this young man with 
the crime. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Even if the State makes a 
statement on the record, the—the only grant of 
immunity that's valid under the statute's a written 
grant signed by the County Attorney himself, and again, 
I think that before— 
THE COURT: Do you have any other problem, other 
than that? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: —we go forward, I think that 
he should probably [have] someone—if he has an 
attorney, I think if he doesn't, I think one should be 
appointed. 
THE COURT: I don't see a problem at this point. 
I'm certainly going to hold the County Attorney to it, 
to the comment and commitment that's been made. I 
realize what you've said, under the statute, is 
correct, it's legally correct; but obviously, the 
County Attorney's Office is going to be hard-pressed to 
bring any action out at the Juvenile Court based on the 
statements [sic] that's been made by the Deputy County 
Attorney. 
So at this point, I'll allow him to go forward 
with the examination of the witness. You've made your 
record. 
(P.H. at 4-8; see Addendum A, attached). The State received no 
evidence as a result of its commitment at the preliminary hearing 
where Brent's testimony was already available to the State in the 
form of his earlier confession to the police (P.H. at 14) 
rendered without the use of promises or exchanges (P.H. at 7, 24-
25). 
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Based on the exchange at the preliminary hearing, 
defendant contends that the following trial testimony, elicited 
by defendant on cross-examination of Brent, was false (Brief of 
Appellant at 7-14): 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINDSTAFF]• Now, you admit you 
tried to forge a check; right? 
[BRENT LINDSEY]. Yes. 
Q. And you were promised you wouldn't go to jail, 
right, if you came and testified against [defendant]? 
A. If I what? — I don't get it. 
Q. Weren't there promises made to you? 
A. No. 
Q. No? Have you been charged with the crime? 
Have you had to go to the detention center? 
A. No. Oh, yes, once. 
Q. That was right after you were arrested; right? 
A. A few weeks — about a week later. 
Q. About a week later you went to court; right? 
A. Yes. 
A. Well, it's not really court. It was — 
A [sic]. You went and met with police officers? 
A. I don't know if it was a police officer. 
Q. Probation officer? From the juvenile system? 
A. I think that's what it was. 
Q. Did they promise you that if you testified 
against [defendant], they wouldn't press any charges 
against you? 
A. No. No, they didn't. 
Q, Have they pressed charges against you? 
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[PROSECUTOR MORGAN]: We are proceeding in bad 
faith. At this point all of that has been answered . 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't believe he's answered 
that question. 
THE COURT: He can answer that question. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. Have there been charges 
pressed against you? 
A. Urn, no. 
Q. No. And why haven't there been charges 
pressed against you? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection. Beyond the personal 
knowledge of the witness. As phrased. 
THE COURT: You can answer the question, if you 
know. 
A. I don't know. . 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. You don't know whether or not 
you haven't be [sic] charged because of your testimony 
in this case? 
A. Yes. I don't know. . 
Q. You don't know. Your [sic] were in court for 
a preliminary hearing, weren't you? And didn't you 
hear the prosecutor represent to you that they would 
not file charges against you? For your testimony? 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. Isn't that what happened? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, your Honor. May we 
approach the bench? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Bench conference off the record.) • • 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. Now, have you been told that 




Q. No? About a month and a half ago, wasn't it 
true that you and your sister sat in a room with a 
police officer and you two were told that if you didn't 
come over and testify against Tom — 
[PROSECUTOR]. Objection. This is getting 
argumentative and — I mean, he's asked — each time 
the the [sic] witness has answered each time that he 
has not been offered anything in this case. Now we are 
going through testimony, I think, that is going way 
collateral to any issues here. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule the 
objection on the presumption that a the [sic] question 
is asked i[n] good faith. 
Members of the jury, you remember when the jury 
selection process was going on, and I indicated to you 
that what counsel says is not evidence. The only 
evidence is what witnesses say. The mere fact that a 
question is asked in such a way that it may sound like 
a statement from counsel, is that is not evidence, and 
I caution you to consider that as we proceed. 
(Tr. at 43-46; see Addendum A, attached). 
A review of the preliminary hearing transcript fully 
supports the accuracy of Brent's testimony that he was not 
testifying because he had received immunity. In response to 
defendant's questions at the preliminary hearing, Brent testified 
that he was not promised that the State would not press charges 
against him if he testified against defendant (P.H. at 7, 25), he 
did not know why charges had not been pursued against him (P.H. 
at 25), and he was not told that if he testified against 
defendant he would not go to detention or jail (Id..).3 This 
testimony is fully consistent with the responses given by Brent 
3
 At one point, Brent responded "[y]esM when defense counsel 
asked him, "You've had certain promises made to you to testify, 
isn't that true?" (P.H. at 16). Counsel did not elaborate on the 
question, and the record does not disclose any promises. 
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at trial and the State's commitment given at the preliminary 
hearing. Defendant provides no evidence that Brent's assertion 
at trial that he could not remember the events of the preliminary 
hearing was perjured testimony requiring correction. 
Brent's truthful testimony in response to defendant's 
questioning at trial did not engender any .false impression which 
would affect the jury's judgment. The false impression alleged 
by defendant is that Brent was testifying "in spite of the effect 
it may have on his own trial" (Brief of Appellant at 12). 
However, the jury knew that Brent had not been charged for his 
part in the crime and therefore knew that no trial was scheduled 
for him. Upon hearing that defendant began making threats to 
Brent after defendant's arrest (Tr. at 59-61, 97), the jury could 
reasonably infer that the threats motivated Brent's testimony. 
The challenged exchange at trial accurately indicated that Brent 
had not been promised immunity from prosecution or detention in 
exchange for his testimony. In light of the remaining evidence, 
the exchange is more fairly interpreted as indicating that Brent 
testified in hopes of later receiving some unspecified form of 
favorable treatment from the State—a point actively argued by 
defendant in closing (Tr. at 208-09). Finally, no objection or 
reference to the alleged false impression was made during trial 
by either counsel or by the trial court, indicating that at the 
time, neither the parties nor the court had identified any false 
impression from Brent's testimony. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 
700 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Utah 1985). Thus, it is unlikely the jury 
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received and was affected by the impression defendant identifies 
as false and prejudicial• 
Brent's testimony at trial was truthful and is 
reinforced by the preliminary hearing transcript. The exchange 
gave no false impression to the jury in light of the remaining 
evidence and their reasonable inferences. Accordingly, there was 
no false evidence for the State to correct. 
Alternatively, defendant acknowledges that his trial 
counsel may have waived this issue by failing to offer at trial 
either the recording or a transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
He contends that his counsel's failure to preserve the issue 
constitutes ineffective assistance. To establish his claim, 
defendant must show that his counsel's failure to act fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered 
prejudice from counsel's deficient performance. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-66 
(1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). Because Brent's trial testimony 
was accurate, there was no error to be preserved by defendant's 
counsel and his action could not be deficient.4 
A
 Defense counsel's failure to present the preliminary hearing 
testimony at trial may also be viewed as a matter of trial strategy 
where the testimony would have corroborated and reinforced Brent's 
contention that he was not promised immunity in exchange for his 
testimony. The fact that counsel's decision to avoid the possible 
adverse consequences to the defense did not prove beneficial to 
defendant does not compel a finding of ineffective assistance. 
State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991); State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 
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B, Reversal is Not Warranted Because Any False Impression did 
not Affect the Judgment of the Jury 
If this Court finds that the cross-examination created 
a false impression, it must then determine whether the impression 
materially impacted the conviction. A material impact occurs 
when there is "a reasonable likelihood the false impression . . . 
could have affected the judgment of the jury." Walker, 624 P.2d 
at 690-911; see also Shabata, 678 P.2d at 789; State v. Jarrell, 
608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980). This materiality standard is 
similar to the "prejudice" prong applied to defendant's 
alternative claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, 
requiring that defendant demonstrate that his counsel's failure 
to act was so prejudicial as "to undermine confidence in the 
reliability of the verdict." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Defendant 
has met neither standard here. 
Application of the materiality standard requires a 
review of the evidence presented to the jury. See, e.g., Walker, 
624 P.2d at 690-91. In this case, the false impression defendant 
advances is not reasonably likely to have affected the jury's 
judgment when weighed against: 1) the facts uncontested by 
defendant at trial confirming part of Brent's testimony; 2) the 
testimony of other witnesses corroborating Brent's testimony; and 
3) the evidence and reasonable inferences suggesting, as 
defendant argued, that Brent received some form of favorable 
treatment from the State. 
1023-24 (Utah 1987). 
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This is not a case w? re the evidence of guilt is 
sufficiently weak or the facts so controverted as to warrant a 
determination that the allegedly false impression affected the 
jury's judgment. See, e.g., id., 624 P.2d at 690-91 (knowingly 
false police testimony linking defendant with a controlled 
substance presented in support of case based solely on 
circumstantial evidence). There is no question in this case that 
the offense occurred. Defendant confirmed numerous facts 
surrounding both the offense and his involvement, including: the 
origin of the check; his call to Brent the morning of the offense 
to arrange to pick Brent up at work (Tr. at 151-52, 162-63, 166-
67); his presence at both venues where Brent tried to cash the 
check (Tr. 152-54); his active phone search for places to cash 
the check without identification (Tr. at 153-54, 178); and 
Brenda's presence throughout the ordeal. The testimony of 
numerous witnesses corroborated Brent's testimony, including: 
the testimony of the pawn shop owner and the store manager 
regarding the events inside their establishments (Tr. at 108-15, 
124-29); the testimony of the arresting officer that when she 
arrested Brent, he stated that defendant's car was parked across 
the street (Tr. at 120-21); and Brenda's testimony verifying 
defendant's active role in cashing the check, his offer of $50.00 
to Brent in exchange for Brent's success (Tr. at 80), his 
repeated admonitions that he not be mentioned in the pawn shop or 
check cashing store (Tr. at 70-72, 80), his use of the scissors 
to cut off the misspelled indorsement on the back of the check 
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(Tr. at 78), and his use of the phone to locate a place to cash 
the check (Tr. at 75-76). Both parties fully argued this 
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in their closing 
remarks. 
Finally, the evidence established that Brent was a 
juvenile with a learning disorder caught in the commission of a 
crime to which he confessed to police (Tr. at 18, 37-38, 42-43, 
48-51, 54, 59), that he had to meet with officers related to the 
juvenile court (Tr. at 45), and that no charges were being 
pursued as of trial (.Id. ). Not only could the jury reasonably 
infer that by telling the authorities about an adult's 
involvement in the crime Brent hoped to obtain some form of 
leniency or favorable treatment from the State for himself, but 
defense counsel expressly argued that inference in his closing 
remarks (Tr. at 208-09). 
Defendant further contends that the prosecutor actively 
fostered the false impression in three respects. First, the 
prosecutor registered an objection to defense counsel's cross-
examination of Brent, stating, "We are proceeding in bad faith. 
At this point all of that has been answered" (Tr. at 44). 
Defendant argues that the statement attributed improper motives 
to his counsel and compounded the effect of the false testimony 
(Brief of Appellant at 12-13). However, the trial court 
overruled the prosecutor's objection, allowed the questioning to 
proceed, and thereafter specifically stated that it presumed that 
the questioning was pursued in good faith (Tr. at 46). The court 
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then directed the jury not to consider either counsel's comments 
as evidence (Id.. ). The jury is presumed to have followed the 
court's instructions absent evidence to the contrary. State v. 
Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367f 370, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974). Hence, 
any adverse effect from the prosecutor's objection was mitigated. 
Second, defendant contends that the State submitted an 
instruction, later given to the jury as instruction number 7, 
which reinforced the false impression with the authority of the 
trial court (Brief of Appellant at 13). However, defendant 
waived this allegation of error, first by expressly informing the 
court at trial that he had no objections to any of the 
instructions (Tr. at 145), State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Utah 1987) (actively informing the trial court that there are no 
objections to jury instructions waives appellate challenge to the 
instructions); see also State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 
(Utah App. 1991) (approving application of the invited error 
doctrine to jury instruction challenges), and second by making an 
insufficient objection after the jury had been instructed, 
claiming that instruction number 7 should be "a little more 
clear" (Tr. at 201). See State v. Kotz, 758 P.2d 463, 466 (Utah 
App. 1988) (objection indicating that an instruction was not 
"appropriate" was insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal); 
State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1976) (a general 
statement that an instruction does not correctly state the law is 
not a sufficient objection to preserve the issue for appeal); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (defendant must state "distinctly the 
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matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection"). 
Consequently, this Court need not reach defendant's allegations 
of error regarding instruction number 7. 
However, should this Court address the merits of this 
challenge, it will find that the instruction does not warrant 
reversal. Defendant challenges this instruction's adverse effect 
on the jury's credibility determination. When reviewing a 
challenge to a single jury instruction, this Court considers the 
instructions as a whole, and, if the instructions "fairly tender 
the case to the jury, the fact that one or more of the 
instructions, standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they 
might have been is not reversible error." State v. Brooks, 638 
P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted); see also Perdue, 
813 P.2d at 1203; State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 
1991). Although standing alone, instruction number 7 may not be 
as clear as it could be, it is not misleading in light of the 
remaining instructions given the jury. A fair reading of 
instruction 7 with the court's verbal clarification accurately 
establishes that the offense involved several people and that 
defendant was charged as a party to the offense (for text of 
instruction number 7, see R. 32 and Addendum B, attached). The 
trial court specifically admonished the jury that its credibility 
determination ran to all witnesses and was to be had pursuant to 
the remaining instructions relating to credibility (Tr. at 199, 
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201). Those instructions are not challenged on appeal.5 The 
jury was further admonished to consider the instructions as a 
whole and to avoid any emphasis on any one instruction (R. 43). 
The instruction lacks any reference to the existence or lack of 
immunity and neither misled nor confused the jury regarding its 
credibility determination in light of the remaining instructions 
given. Consequently, instruction number 7 did not foster the 
allegedly false impression. 
Third, defendant contends that the prosecutor made 
statements in his closing remarks to the jury which fostered the 
allegedly false impression that supposedly bolstered Brent's 
credibility (Brief of Appellant at 12-14; for closing arguments, 
see Addendum C, attached).6 However, the statements were within 
the scope of permissible closing argument and were not reasonably 
likely to have affected the jury's judgment. Throughout the 
trial and during opening and closing remarks, both the court and 
counsel repeatedly reminded the jury about its responsibility to 
find the facts, determine the credibility of the witnesses, weigh 
all the evidence, and make their ultimate decision concerning the 
5
 The record indicates that defendant neither submitted nor 
requested an instruction providing "important and correct 
information concerning the credibility of Brent Lindsey" (Brief of 
Appellant at 13-14). Consequently, he may not assert error in the 
court's failure to instruct on the additional information. See 
State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410, 413, 490 P.2d 890, 892 (1971) 
(failure to request an instruction on a certain subject bars a 
later claim that the court's failure to instruct on that subject is 
error). 
6
 Defendant alleges that these remarks also constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct. See Point II, below. 
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guilt or innocence of the defendant (R. 30, 32, 34, 36, 43-46; 
Tr. 12-13, 14-16, 46, 62, 117, 132, 198-201, 203, 204, 206, 209, 
213). Because more than one individual was involved in 
commission of the offense charged against defendant, the court 
took great care to instruct the jury immediately prior to the 
prosecution's closing statement that its verdict was to be 
limited to defendant's guilt or innocence only and not that of 
any other person involved in the offense (R. 32; Tr. at 198-201). 
In his initial closing remarks, the prosecutor discussed the 
evidence, acknowledging that the jury must decide the credibility 
of the witnesses (Tr. at 203-05). He then pointed out the 
evidence corroborating Brent's testimony and the lack of evidence 
supporting defendant's story (Tr. at 205-06), immediately 
following which he said: 
Keep in mind, I would ask you, that Brent is not 
on trial. That is for another day. The defendant is 
on trial. It is his credibility that I would suggest 
is really in issue in this case. . . . 
(Tr. at 206). Defendant contends that this improperly suggests 
to the jury that Brent had not received immunity and would, in 
fact, be tried at some future date. However, the distinction 
made between the ultimate determination of defendant's guilt or 
innocence and that of Brent is proper in the context of this case 
and is an appropriate matter to be considered by the jury. Both 
the parties and the court exhibited genuine concern that the jury 
recognize the boundaries of its responsibilities. The 
prosecutor's comments, a small part of his closing remarks, were 
at the end of his initial closing argument, indicating a desire 
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to refocus the jury's attention from the evidence previously 
discussed to their ultimate decision of the guilt or innocence of 
defendant. Although not artful, they are not improper as they 
constitute an accurate admonition to the jury that the ultimate 
decision should not encompass Brent's guilt, thereby reinforcing 
the court's similar admonition to the jury. Even assuming the 
statements were improper, their effect likely was negligible in 
view of the remaining evidence and defendant's subsequent 
argument which not only emphasized the likelihood of favorable 
treatment for Brent due to his testimony against defendant (Tr. 
at 208-09), but also echoed the prosecutor's remarks: "[Brent 
and Brenda] are not on trial in this case; [defendant] is" (Tr. 
at 209). 
Defendant also challenges statements made by the 
prosecutor in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument as 
fostering the allegedly false impression to the jury. 
Defendant's closing argument focused on the credibility and bias 
of Brent and Brenda, emphasizing that Brent was lying in an 
attempt to escape "the penalties that he may face" and that 
Brenda lied for her brother because he faced "a possible long 
term detention" (Tr. at 208-10). In his rebuttal statements, the 
prosecutor refuted defense counsel's bias arguments, at one point 
saying, "[Brent] incriminates himself all the away [sic] through 
the case" (Tr. at 215). Defendant contends that this statement 
fosters the allegedly false impression that Brent testified 
without regard for its effect on his own trial. However, that 
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simple statement is one of fact based on Brent's admission of 
guilt, which was part of the evidence to be considered by the 
jury. 
Given the evidence before the jury discussed above, 
together with defense counsel's express argument that the 
evidence supported a determination directly opposite the 
impression he alleges on appeal, it is unlikely that the 
prosecutor's statements sufficiently emphasized the challenged 
impression, assuming it ever existed, to render the impression 
reasonably likely to have affected the jury's judgment. To hold 
otherwise would be to sanction invited error. The record is 
clear that defendant initiated and prolonged the immunity 
discourse at trial, mischaracterized the State's commitment as an 
exchange of immunity for Brent's testimony despite full knowledge 
to the contrary, and failed to correct the false impression he 
now claims the exchange created, despite ample opportunity to do 
so. He cannot now successfully assert error from a situation he 
created, then ignored. See State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 573 
(Utah App. 1991) (defendant's failure to seek court's assistance 
in masking parts of transcript at trial prevented assertion of 
error on appeal; defendant cannot "ignore a potentially improper 
situation at trial, thus inviting or compounding error, and opt 
to raise it on appeal after the outcome of the action is adverse 
to him"); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1349-50 (Utah App. 1991) 
(it is not appropriate for the defense to invite error and rely 
on it for appeal); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 
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1989), cert, denied, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990) ("[I]f a 
party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain 
from objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will 
then decline to save that party from the error."). 
Because the allegedly false impression, assuming that 
it actually arose, was not reasonably likely to have affected the 
jury's judgment under the circumstances of the case, it follows 
that defense counsel's alleged failure to correct the false 
impression was not so prejudicial as to "undermine confidence in 
the reliability of the verdict", Frame, 723 P.2d at 405, and 
defendant's alternative claim of ineffective assistance must also 
fail. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED REVIEW OF THE PROSECUTOR'S 
CLOSING REMARKS; ALTERNATIVELY, THE REMARKS 
WERE NEITHER IMPROPER NOR PREJUDICIAL AND 
WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF PROPER CLOSING 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that in closing argument the 
prosecutor made several statements which amount to prosecutorial 
misconduct. First, he contends that the prosecutor's closing 
remarks improperly emphasized Brent Lindsey's alleged "lack of 
immunity" (Brief of Appellant at 20). Second, he argues that 
several statements made in the prosecutor's initial closing 
remarks as well as an assertion of defendant's guilt made at the 
end of the prosecution's closing argument improperly urged the 
jury to base its decision on societal concerns extraneous to the 
evidence at trial, and erroneously injected the prosecutor's 
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personal opinions which inflamed the jury to "act out of improper 
motive" (Brief of Appellant at 20-24). However, defendant failed 
to preserve these objections for appellate review. In the 
alternative, if defendant's challenges are deemed preserved for 
appeal, the conviction should be affirmed because, under the 
totality of the circumstances of the case, the statements neither 
suggest to the jury matters it may not consider in deliberations 
nor exceed the scope of permissible closing argument. See State 
v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 786 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
Defendant failed to object to all but one of the 
prosecutor's closing statements to which he assigns error on 
appeal.7 Although a trial court may have an obligation to 
correct, sua sponte, improper remarks made to the jury, this 
Court has held that a party's failure to make a contemporaneous 
and specific objection at trial will preclude appellate review of 
an alleged improper prosecutorial argument. Compare State v. 
Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 1985), with Humphrey, 793 P.2d 
at 925, and State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1226-27 (Utah 1989), 
and State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982). Even where 
appellate review is had, the absence of an objection is a factor 
in determining the prejudicial impact of the challenged argument. 
7
 The sole objection to the prosecutor's remarks which was 
registered by defendant at trial relates to the prosecutor's 
characterization of the importance of this case and is addressed at 
the end of Point II. 
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See Smith, 700 P.2d at 1113 (finding a failure to object as 
indicative that "defendant's concerns about improper influence 
have arisen in the course of the preparation of this appeal, 
rather than from perceptions at the time of trial."). If 
appellate review is granted to defendant's challenges, those 
allegations will be found meritless. 
"Counsel for both sides have considerable latitude in 
their arguments to the jury; they have a right to discuss fully 
from their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom." State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 
60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973); see also State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 
954, 959 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 
(Utah 1988), rev'd on other grounds, Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d 
1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 
1942 (1992). A prosecutor's remarks will not warrant reversal 
unless they meet the two-part test established by the Utah 
Supreme Court: M(1) did the remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they could not properly consider in 
determining their verdict, and (2) was the error substantial and 
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
without the error the result would have been more favorable for 
the defendant." Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925; see also Harrison, 
805 P.2d at 786; state v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah App. 
1990); Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P.2d at 426. Application of 
part two of the test involves consideration of the entire record 
and the circumstances involved in each case, including an 
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evaluation of the evidence of guilt. State v. Andreason, 718 
P.2d 400, 402-03 (Utah 1986); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984). The more compelling the proof of guilt, the less 
closely this Court will scrutinize the conduct. Troy, 688 P.2d 
at 846. 
Defendant's first challenge regarding the prosecutor's 
allegedly improper emphasis on Brent's "lack of immunity" is 
discussed fully in Point 1(B) above, regarding the State's 
alleged use of false testimony. That discussion also illustrates 
that the challenged comments do not meet either prong of the test 
for prosecutorial misconduct. The remarks reflect facts already 
in evidence and do not present the jury with matters not properly 
considered by them. Similarly, the absence of the challenged 
remarks would not likely have resulted in a more favorable result 
for defendant in light of the remaining evidence discussed in 
Point 1(B), including defendant's express assertion that the 
evidence implies some grant or hope of favorable treatment for 
Brent due to his testimony, and the fact that defendant's own 
testimony reinforced Brent's admission of guilt. 
Defendant also challenges several additional excerpts 
from the prosecutor's closing remarks which may be divided into 
two groups. The first group follows the prosecutor's discussion 
of the evidence relating to the elements of the crime and 
defendant's intent and knowledge of numerous facts presented at 
the trial. He then summarizes the State's deduction from its 
view of the evidence, saying: 
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Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that defendant 
is guilty. He's the guiltiest defendant that has ever 
engaged in this business. That is a despicable crime, 
to use someone else to commit the crime that you, if 
you had the guts to, would at least commit yourself. 
(Tr. at 204-05; see Addendum C, attached). Defendant contends 
that these statements represent the prosecutor's personal opinion 
regarding the defendant's guilt and improperly asks the jury to 
punish defendant out of a "policy to punish 'despicable' people" 
(Brief of Appellant at 24). However, the prosecutor has a right 
to discuss fully from the State's viewpoint the evidence, 
inferences and deductions which establish defendant's guilt. See 
Seel, 827 P.2d at 959; Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P.2d at 426. 
Consequently, the remarks are within the range of permissible 
arguments available to both sides. See Day, 815 P.2d at 1350; 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560 (Utah 1987) (citations 
omitted). Although his characterization of the crime as 
despicable is more spirited than may be desirable, it is not 
improper. He ties his conclusion of guilt directly to the 
evidence presented at trial, and does not inject a plea regarding 
societal concerns or the jury's duty to address those concerns. 
See, e.g., Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402 (finding improper an 
argument that defendant's "conduct was pervasive, that others 
were involved in similar conduct, and that the jury needed to be 
concerned about those 'who aren't innocent but are turned 
loose.'"); Smith, 700 P.2d at 1112 (finding improper an argument 
asking, "[d]o we go so far in determining that we don't punish an 
innocent man that we let too many guilty ones go . • . " ) . In 
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the context of the totality of the case, including repeated 
instructions to the jury that statements by counsel were not to 
be considered as evidence, the comments would have little impact, 
The lack of objections by defense counsel to the comments 
supports their minimal prejudicial impact. See Smith, 700 P.2d 
at 1113. 
The second group of comments challenged by defendant 
occurred as the prosecutor began his initial closing remarks: 
[PROSECUTOR]: . . . I think that in this case, 
more than any other, I think we have to consider that 
everyone in this country has a right to be protected 
under the law. I think Mr. Schoor [sic] deserves that 
protection. 
I think the witnesses who have testified in this 
case deserve that protection. Brent Lindsev, as well 
as the defendant, has put his faith in that system. 
Brent Lindsev, as you heard him testify at the 
conclusion of this case, said, "No, I'm not afraid of 
the defendant," even though he testified he was 
threatened by him. 
He says that because he has people around him that 
will protect him. I'd like to think the State of Utah 
did its job in protecting Brent Lindsey and allowing 
him to get up on that stand and give his story. 
Now this is as far as I can go. From here on it's 
up to you. You can either look at the evidence, come 
to a just conclusion and render a verdict that protects 
Mr. Lindsev, or vou can not come to a conclusion, you 
can get upset, vou can get angry about things that 
really have nothing to do with this case, and vou can 
walk away from this. 
I'm going to be back here tomorrow. So is Mr. 
Grindstaff, so is the Judge. We've lots of other 
cases. You may have noticed during that trial that I 
got pretty angry at times. This isn't a murder trial. 
I've done murder trials before, but I don't think I 
have seen such an important case as this for a long, 
long time. 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object to him discussing his 
personal opinions. And his personal views. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
[PROSECUTOR]: It's important for that very 
reason, that in this case we have to discuss something 
that only jurors can decide. 
(Tr. at 202-03; see Addendum C, attached) .(emphasis added). 
Defendant challenges each of the three highlighted segments as 
advancing the prosecutor's personal opinions and improperly 
urging the jury to decide the case based on extraneous societal 
concerns. 
The prosecutor's reference to the basic premise of 
protection under the law is no more than a broadly accurate 
prefatory statement, and any prejudice flowing therefrom would be 
abated by counsel's blanket application of the protection to the 
country's entire populace, all the witnesses in this case, andf 
more specifically, to Brent as well as to defendant (Tr. at 202). 
His example of Brent's "faith" in the judicial system is simply a 
restatement of evidence received at trial and already properly 
before the jury (Tr. at 59-62). 
Defendant compares these statements with those 
condemned in West Valley City v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Utah App. 
1987). However, the prosecutor in this case, unlike the one in 
Rislow, did not urge that defendant's guilt or innocence hinged 
on whether the jurors wanted to encourage or stop other people in 
society from committing the same crime in areas frequented by the 
jurors. Although in verbally shifting the burden of a final 
decision to the jury the prosecutor urges a verdict "that 
33 
protects Mr. Lindsey", he mitigates any potential prejudice by 
expressly and accurately tying the jury's verdict to the evidence 
in this case and does not urge improper consideration of matters 
extraneous to the case. See Troy, 718 P.2d at 486 (reiterating 
the jury's duty to convict solely on the evidence and condemning 
statements suggesting a different basis for the decision). 
Defendant's failure to object to the statements below indicates 
their minimal prejudicial potential. Smith, 700 P.2d at 1113. 
In accordance with his objection below, defendant 
challenges the prosecutor's characterization of the importance of 
this case as an improper personal opinion "calculated to inflame 
the jury to act out of improper motive" (Brief of Appellant at 
23-24). The State does not condone the prosecutor's comparison, 
but contends that the prosecutor's immediate explanation of his 
remark adequately mitigated any prejudice which may otherwise 
have resulted. After advancing the statement, the prosecutor 
specifically interpreted it for the jury, indicating, as does 
defendant on appeal, that the importance stems from the fact that 
jurors alone can decide the extent of knowledge to be imputed to 
the parties, the credibility of the witnesses heard at trial, and 
the ultimate guilt or innocence of this defendant (Tr. at 203-04; 
Brief of Appellant at 23). The statement neither urges the 
jury's use of extraneous information nor advocates that the 
jurors ignore either the court's instructions or the evidence 
before them. The jury reasonably could differentiate between a 
murder trial and the forgery case before it, and defendant has 
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failed to establish any reasonable likelihood that absent the 
comparison the verdict would have been more favorable. Without 
prejudice, the remark could be no more than harmless error. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 555; Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P.2d at 
426; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 30 ("[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded"). 
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, 
the prosecutor's comments are within the scope of permissible 
argument as they concern the State's perspective of the evidence 
before the jury and the reasonable inferences and deductions 
arising therefrom. The comments do not urge a decision based on 
extraneous matters, and did not prejudice defendant. 
POINT III 
ANY ERROR IN THE STATE'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF 
DEFENDANT CONCERNING ANOTHER WITNESS' 
VERACITY WAS HARMLESS WHERE DEFENDANT 
SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE AND THE COURT SUSTAINED 
DEFENDANT'S TIMELY OBJECTIONS 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly 
cross-examined defendant concerning Mr. Lords' veracity, thereby 
unfairly commenting on defendant's credibility and urging the 
jury to deal improperly with the credibility issue (Brief of 
Appellant at 25). Regardless of the propriety of the 
prosecutor's inquiries, any error in the questioning was harmless 
where the court sustained defendant's timely objections and 
thereby mitigated any potential prejudice. 
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During the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant, 
he asked three questions (highlighted below) which defendant 
challenges on appeal as being unfairly prejudicial: 
[PROSECUTOR:] You heard Mr. Lords testimony that 
he served Brent and that he recalls very distinctly 
that he is the one that took the check from Brent on 
that occasion and it was misspelled on the back? 
[DEFENDANT:] Yes, I did hear Mr- Lords say that. 
Q. Is that different what [sic] than what you're 
telling the jury now? It is, isn't it? 
A. Yes. But — what I do remember is Mr. Lords 
helping me, and Danny helping Brent. 
Q. So Jack is not telling the truth? 
A. I am sure Jack is telling what he can 
remember. 
Q. Well, a misspelled check, that was an unusual 
occurrence, isn't it? 
A. Awe, I — 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Your Honor, I 
don't think it's relevant. 
THE COURT: Overruled. It's cross-examination. 
[PROSECUTOR:] Wouldn't you agree that a person 
who endorses a check made out to him and misspells 
their own name is an unusual occurrence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And wouldn't you remember the person who 
presented you a check and misspelled his own name? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, asking for 
conjecture. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. Yes. 
[PROSECUTOR:] So why do you think Jack Lords is 
confused? 
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A. I don't think it's — 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]; Objection, I don't think he 
has the — 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
[PROSECUTOR:] Why, under these ciscumstances 
rsicl, do vou believe that Jack Lords is mistaken? 
A. I believe — 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't think it's relevant, 
what his opinion is as to Jack Lords — 
THE COURT: I'm going the [sic] sustain the 
objection. 
(Tr. at 174-76) (emphasis added). 
The courts in this jurisdiction have not directly ruled 
on the propriety of asking a witness or a defendant at trial 
questions regarding the veracity of another witness. But see 
State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah April 7, 1992) 
(indicating in dicta that such questions would be improper). Of 
the other jurisdictions addressing the issue, a clear majority 
have found such questioning to be improper to varying degrees. 
See, e.g., People v. Best, 424 N.E.2d 29, 32 (111. App. 1981) 
(although improper, "veracity opinion questions alone do not 
constitute reversible error"); State v. Flanagan, 801 P.2d 675, 
679 (N.M. App.), cert, denied, 801 P.2d 659 (N.M. 1990) (imposing 
strict prohibition on asking a defendant on cross-examination if 
another witness is "mistaken" or "lying", but providing that 
admission of all other forms of such questions lies within the 
trial court's discretion; finding the trial court's failure to 
sustain defendant's objection to prohibited questions was 
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harmless error); Pankratz v. State, 663 P.2d 26, 28 (Okl. Cr. 
1983) (such questioning is an effort to impeach which, although 
not desirable, is not necessarily error); State v. Casteneda-
Perez, 810 P.2d 74, 79 (Wash. App. 1991) (condemning practice as 
improper). Regardless of the degree of disapproval accorded such 
questioning, courts have not held that the practice requires 
reversal per se. Instead, they universally turn to a harmless 
error analysis to determine whether the evidentiary impropriety 
resulted in sufficient prejudice to defendant to warrant 
reversal. Best, 424 N.E.2d at 32; Flanagan, 801 P.2d at 679-80; 
Casteneda-Perez, 810 P.2d at 79, 
Even if the contested questions before this Court are 
found to be improper, reversal would not be warranted because 
defendant suffered only minimal, if any, prejudice. Defendant 
has the burden of establishing the existence of reversible error. 
State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989). An error 
requires reversal only if there is "a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result" absent the error. State v. Tuttle, 780 
P.2d 1203, 1213 n.12 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Evid. 103; Utah R. 
Crim. P. 30. 
The only objections made by defendant to the three 
veracity inquiries occurred following the second and third 
questions and were sustained by the trial court (Tr. at 175-76). 
Because defendant failed to object to counsel's first question 
concerning Lords' truthfulness, he waived appellate review of the 
question. Day, 815 P.2d at 1349-50 (failure to raise an 
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objection constitutes waiver of the alleged error); Humphrey, 793 
P.2d at 925 (failure to object to cross-examination constitutes 
waiver of appellate review of the alleged errors); Hales, 652 
P.2d at 1292; see also Casteneda-Perez, 810 P.2d at 79 (defendant 
waived review of the initial stage of the improper cross-
examination due to his failure to make a definite objection until 
after the questioning was well underway). 
Even on the merits, defendant's appellate challenge to 
the prosecutor's initial question must fail because the 
prejudicial dangers feared in such a situation did not 
materialize. Defendant's response to this question offered a 
plausible explanation for the suggested discrepancy, thereby 
sidestepping the predicted response of labeling either Lords or 
himself as a liar and suggesting instead that neither was 
deliberately lying. See Flanagan, 801 P.2d at 679-80 (questions 
intended to clarify discrepancies are acceptable; holding that 
improper questions are harmless where defendant's responses 
avoided the dangers feared by the court). It was well within 
defendant's knowledge to provide an opinion as to the reason for 
the differences in the testimony, Id.., 801 P.2d at 679-80, and 
his response diffused the possibility that the jury would feel 
bound to label one or the other a liar. See Casteneda-Perez, 810 
P.2d at 79-80 (witnesses' responses alerted the jury that any 
discrepancies may not be due to false testimony). 
The prosecutor's subsequent questions do not warrant 
reversal because any prejudice resulting from the questions was 
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avoided by timely, successful objections forestalling any 
response by defendant. Additionally, there was minimal, if any, 
impact on the proceedings where the questioning was neither 
prolonged nor argumentative, the issue was not argued in closing 
argument, and the questions were restricted to a single 
discrepancy in the testimony of one witness who did not testify 
regarding any criminal behavior by defendant (see Brief of 
Appellant at 25). Any potential prejudice from the single 
discrepancy was minimized where both sides vigorously argued the 
credibility of numerous witnesses in their closing arguments, the 
differences between the parties' versions of the evidence was 
abundantly clear to the jury, and the jury was adequately 
admonished throughout the proceedings that the questions by 
counsel did not constitute evidence (Tr. at 5-6, 46). Absent 
evidence to the contrary, the jurors are presumed to have 
followed the instructions. State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 370, 
517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974); see also State v. White, 577 P.2d 
552, 555 (Utah 1978). Given such brief, isolated questioning and 
the adequate mitigation provided by the prompt action of both 
defendant and the court, there could be no reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome absent the questioning. Accordingly, 




THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE BECAUSE NO 
MULTIPLE, SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS WERE COMMITTED 
BELOW 
Defendant finally contends that even if the individual 
errors he asserts do not warrant reversal .of his conviction, the 
aggregate of the errors constitutes "fundamental and reversible 
error" (Brief of Appellant at 25-26). However, the cumulative 
error doctrine does not apply where no multiple, substantial 
errors were committed. State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 
1987); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant claims error relating to production of false 
testimony, prosecutorial misconduct, improper cross-examination, 
and, alternatively, ineffective assistance of counsel. As the 
preceding arguments demonstrate, defendant has waived most of the 
alleged errors, and the remaining errors are at most harmless. 
Accordingly, the cumulative error doctrine should not apply, and 
defendant's conviction should be affirmed. See State v. Johnson, 
784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989); State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 
38 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); 
Rammel, 721 P.2d at 501-02; but see State v. Emmett, 184 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah April 7, 1992) (several potentially 
harmless errors combined with an egregious instance of 
prosecutorial misconduct warrant a new trial). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //^ciay of August, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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1 THAT THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE READ IN SUBSTANTIALLY THE 
2 FORM THAT THEY ARE TYPED, AND THAT ANY DEVIATION 
3 THEREFROM IS OF NO PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE? 
4 MR. MORGAN: FROM THE STATE, YES, YOUR HONOR. 
5 MR. GRINDSTAFF: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
6 THE COURT: COUPLE OF ITEMS, MEMBERS OF THE 
7 JURY, BEFORE WE BEGIN CLOSING ARGUMENT. I WANT YOU TO 
8 REFER TO INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN. THERE MAY BE A 
9 SUGGESTION TO YOU IN THERE THAT MORE THAN ONE PERSON HAS 
10 BEEN NAMED IN THIS INFORMATION. 
11 THAT IS NOT THE CASE. I BELIEVE WHAT THE INTENT OF 
12 THIS INSTRUCTIONS IS, IS TO POINT OUT TO YOU THAT MORE 
13 THAN ONE PERSON — THAT IT CAN BE ALLEGED THAT MORE THAN 
14 ONE PERSON WAS INVOLVED IN THE CHARGE IN THIS CASE. THE 
15 POINT OF THIS IS TO INDICATE THAT MR. SCHNOOR IS BEING 
16 CHARGED AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE. 
17 AM I CORRECT IN THAT? 
18 MR. MORGAN: YES. 
19 THE COURT: IS THERE ANY FURTHER ELABORATION 
20 NECESSARY, OR RETRACTION OF ANYTHING THAT I'VE JUST SAID 
21 THERE, MR. MORGAN? 
22 MR. MORGAN: PERHAPS WE OUGHT TO APPROACH THE 
23 BENCH, YOUR HONOR. 
24 (BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE RECORD.) 
25 THE COURT: ONE THING FURTHER ON INSTRUCTION 
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1 NUMBER SEVEN, MEMBERS OF THE JURY. THAT INSTRUCTION IS 
2 OBVIOUSLY REFERRING, ALBEIT OBLIOELY, TO THE TWO LINDSEYS 
3 WHO TESTIFIED, BRENT AND BRENDA. 
4 IN THAT CONNECTION, YOU'RE TO ADHERE TO THIS 
5 INSTRUCTION, THE LAST SENTENCE, WHICH INDICATES THAT YOU 
6 ARE NOT TO CONCERN YOURSELF WITH THEIR STATUS. YOU'RE TO 
7 CONSIDER THEIR TESTIMONY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OTHER 
8 INSTRUCTIONS OF THIS COURT WHICH ARE IN THIS PACKAGE 
9 WHICH WILL ASSIST YOU IN MAKING YOUR DETERMINATION AS TO 
10 THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES. 
11 ONE OTHER THING I THINK I NEED TO TELL YOU IS THAT I 
12 RAPIDLY PUT THIS SET OF INSTRUCTIONS TOGETHER OF ONES 
13 THAT ARE ON THE WORD PROCESSER IN THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD 
14 BE ABLE TO INSTRUCT YOU YESTERDAY AND GET THIS COMPLETED. 
15 IN MY HASTE TO DO SO, YOU WILL SEE THAT THERE WERE 
16 TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS, BUT MORE PARTICULARLY, THAT THERE 
17 WERE SOME ERRORS IN GENDER REFERENCE. THE SET OF 
18 INSTRUCTIONS THAT I NORMALLY USE, THAT I LIKE TO KEEP, 
19 ARE GENDER-BLIND, AND IF ANYONE IS OFFENDED BY THAT, I 
20 APOLOGIZE. 
21 IT'S JUST AN OLD SET, AND I WON'T USE THEM AGAIN. 
22 ALSO, I WANT TO INDICATE TO YOU THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO 
23 WORRY ABOUT DRAFTING A VERDICT OF YOUR OWN. WE HAVE 
24 VERDICT FORMS THAT WILL GO WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
25 THAT PRESENT EACH OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVES THAT YOU WILL 
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1 THAN PRESENTED WITH. 
2 AFTER YOUR DELIBERATIONS, YOU SELECT THE APPROPRIATE 
3 ONE AND HAVE THE FOREPERSON DATE AND EXECUTE THE 
4 APPROPRIATE ONE, AND SEND BACK TO ME BOTH THE ONE SIGNED 
5 THE ONE NOT SIGNED, THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND THE 
6 EXHIBITS WHICH WILL BE IN THERE WITH YOU. 
7 DO COUNSEL HAVE ANY OBJECTION AS TO ANY OF THE 
8 THINGS THAT I HAVE INDICATED TO THE JURY SINCE READING 
9 THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS? MR. MORGAN? 
10 MR. MORGAN: NOTHING FROM THE STATE. 
11 MR. GRINDSTAFF: ONE OBJECTION. BUT I WOULD 
12 RATHER DO IT AFTER— 
13 THE COURT: WELL, I NEED TO BE ALERTED IF 
14 THERE IS SOMETHING I CAN CORRECT. I'M CERTAINLY GOING TO 
15 CORRECT IT IF IT'S APPROPRIATE. SO WHY DON'T YOU COME TO 
16 THE SIDEBAR. 
17 (BENCH CONFERENCE, OFF THE RECORD.) 
16 THE COURT: ONE FINAL THING, AND I SAY THIS IN AN 
19 ABUNDANCE OF CAUTION, THAT I MAKE CERTAIN THAT I HAVE NOT 
20 MISSTATED ANYTHING AND I DON'T STATE IT FOR ANY PURPOSE 
21 OF REPETITION OR ANY UNDUE EMPHASIS ON THIS POINT. IF I 
22 STATED IT BEFORE AND YOU UNDERSTOOD IT AS I STATED IT 
23 BEFORE, DON'T THINK I AM TRYING TO EMPHASIZE IT, BECAUSE 
24 I MAY STATE IT AGAIN. 
25 THE LAST SENTENCE IN INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN, IS 
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1 NOT IN ANY WAY TO SUGGEST THAT YOU ARE NOT TO CONSIDER 
2 THE BELIEVABILITY OR THE CREDIBILITY OF BRENT AND BRENDA 
3 LINDSEY IN THE SAME MANNER THAT YOU CONSIDER THE 
4 CREDIBILITY OF ANY OTHER WITNESS. 
5 YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER THAT ISSUE. YOU WILL CONSIDER 
6 THAT IN THE SAME WAY AND UNDER THE;SAME INSTRUCTIONS AS 
7 YOU WOULD CONSIDER THE CREDIBILITY OF MR. SCHNOOR OR ANY 
8 OTHER WITNESS WHO TESTIFIED HERE. 
9 DOES THAT TAKE CARE OF YOUR PROBLEM? 
10 MR. GRINDSTAFF: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH? 
11 THE COURT: DOES IT OR DOES IT NOT? 
12 MR. GRINDSTAFF: I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE A 
13 LITTLE MORE CLEAR. 
14 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. FURTHER OBJECTIONS 
15 OVERRULED. ARE YOU READY FOR CLOSING? 
16 MR. MORGAN: STATE IS, YOUR HONOR. 
17 THE COURT: GO AHEAD, MR. MORGAN. 
18 MR. MORGAN: MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, MR. 
19 GRINDSTAFF, MR. SCHNOOR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: THIS IS 
20 CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
21 AS MR. GRINDSTAFF STAFF INDICATED EARLIER, I WILL BE 
22 GIVING A STATEMENT OF THE STATE'S CASE, HE WILL BE GIVING 
23 HIS ARGUMENTS THE CASE, AND THEN I WILL BE BACK FOR 
24 REBUTTAL ONE LAST TIME. 





























IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
THOMAS W. SCHNOOR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 901002110FS 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 29th day of March, 1990, 
the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
APPEARANCES: 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
MR. MARTIN VERHOEF 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MR. DAVID L. GRINDSTAFF 
Attorney at Law 
395 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
1
 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2
 BY MR. VERHOEF: 
3
 Q Would you please state your full name and spell your 
4 last name, sir? 
5
 A Brent Lindsey, L-i-n-d-s-e-y. Lindsey, 
6 Q And how old are you, Brent? 
7 A I'm 16. 
8 Q Okay. And are you aware of the meaning of the oath to 
9
 tell the truth that you just took? 
10 A Yes. I am. 
11 Q Okay. Are you acquainted with the defendant, Thomas 
12 w. Schnoor? 
13 A Yes. I am. 
14 MR. GRINDSTAFF: Your Honor, there—there's one matter 
15 I might address the Court on. It's my—looking at the police 
16 report, it appears that Mr. Lindsey is identified as a suspect 
17 and there's been a juvenile referral on this particular case. 
18 And I don't think that it's appropriate that—that we—I give 
19 him legal advice, or even the Court; but if he testifies, what 
20 he says may incriminate himself. 
21 THE COURT: Is he charged? 
22 MR. VERHOEF: Let me ask the question to the witness, 
23 your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . Go ahead. 
25 Q (By Mr. Verhoef) Mr. Lindsey, are you—were you 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
1
 referred to Juvenile Court as a result of this offense? 
2
 A Yes. 
3
 Q And is there a matter pending in Juvenile Court 
4 currently? 
5 A What do you mean? I don't— 
6 Q Well, maybe that's a bad question. 
7 Why don't you tell the Judge what the status of that is 
8 over in Juvenile Court? 
9 A Well, the—I don't—I don't get what you're saying. 
10 Q What happened—did you go to Court on that? 
11 A Yes. I did go to Court. 
12 Q Do you have anything left to do with the Court on that 
13 deal? 
14 THE COURT: What happened i n Court? 
15 THE WITNESS: W e l l , they j u s t t o l d me t o w a i t — w a i t 
16 for t h e main—main c o u r t day . 
17 THE COURT: When's t h a t ? 
18 THE WITNESS: This d a y , t o l d me t o w a i t and come back 
19 t h i s day . 
20 THE COURT: Are you charged out there in Juvenile 
21 Court? 
22 THE WITNESS: Oh. No, I'm not charged out there. 
23 THE COURT: Were you fined, out there? 
24 THE WITNESS: No. 
25 THE COURT: Ordered to commu—any community service? 
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1
 THE WITNESS: Huh uh, no, I wasn't, sir. 
2
 THE COURT: Okay. Why did you go out there then? 
3
 THE WITNESS: They—I had to talk to some—some guy, 
* I don't know his name and stuff, but he gave me a card of his—^ 
5 what—his name and stuff. 
6 THE COURT: Do you ever have to appear out there again? 
7 THE WITNESS: No. 
8 THE COURT: Do you have a probation officer— 
9 THE WITNESS: No. 
10 THE COURT: —out at Juvenile Court? 
11 Is there anybody out there that you have to talk to? 
12 THE WITNESS: No. 
13 MR. GRINDSTAFF: If I could voir dire the witness, 
14 your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: You may. 
16 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. GRINDSTAFF: 
IB Q As a result of an alleged crime of passing some sort of 
19 forged instrument, did you have to go to Juvenile Court? 
20 A Did I have to? 
21 Q Right. The place out on—in South Salt Lake City? 
22 A Yes. I went there. 
23 I Q You went there? And are you return there? 
24 A No. 
25 Q What happened when you went there? 
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1
 A They just talked to me and told me that I was going to 
2
 come up to the real—real judge and stuff like that/ and said I 
3
 was probably going to get a fine—fine or nothing like that, 
4 just be like a witness and stuff. 
5
 Q Have you been granted immunity— 
6 A No. 
7 Q —from charges? you have no written—nothing in 
8 writing or no promises made that you wouldn't be charged in the 
9
 future? 
10 A No. 
11 THE COURT: I don't see any problem in going ahead with 
12 this witness at this point. 
13 MR. GRINDSTAFF: TWO problems/ one is—obviously, we 
14 can't give him advice but—we're not his attorney/ but 
15 potentially, looking at the — 
16 THE COURT: Well, let me ask, is it the intention of 
17 the State to charge this defendant in Juvenile Court? 
18 MR. VERHOEF: It's my understanding. Detective Mossier 
19 has just informed me that the charges were once filed in 
20 juvenile Court but have been dismissed; isn't that right? 
21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's correct. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. And are you making a commitment now 
23 on behalf of the State that you're not going to file charges 
24 against the defendant in Juvenile Court based on this incident? 
25 MR. VERHOEF: Yes# I will/ your Honor. For the record, 
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 the State will not charge this young man with the crime. 
2
 MR. GRINDSTAFF: Even if the State makes a statement 
3 on the record, the—the only grant of immunity that's valid 
4 under the statute's a written grant signed by the County 
5
 Attorney himself, and again, I think that before— 
6
 THE COURT: Do you have any other problem, other than 
7 that? 
8 MR. GRINDSTAFF: — w e go forward, I think that he 
9
 should probably has someone—if he has an attorney, I think 
10 if he doesn't/ I think one should be appointed. 
11 THE COURT: I don't see a problem at this point. I'm 
12 certainly going to hold the County Attorney to it, to the 
13 comment and commitment that's been made. I realize what you've 
14 said, under the statute, is correct, it's legally correct; but! 
15 obviously, the County Attorney's Office is going to be hard-
16 pressed to bring any action out at the Juvenile Court based 
17 on the statements that's been made by the Deputy County Attorney, 
18 So at this point, I'll allow him to go forward with 
19 the examination of the witness. You've made your record• 
20 MR. VERHOEF: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continuing) 
22 BY MR. VERHOEF: 
23 Q Brent, I think my question was, are you acquainted 
24 with the defendant, Thomas «• Schnoor? 
25 A Yes. I am. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, *"] 
Although there is more than one person named in this 
action, the case against each person is separate from and 
independant of that of the other. In this action the only 
defendant on trial is Thomas W. Schnoor. You are not to concern 
yourselves with the status of any other person or defendant named 
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ADDENDUM C 
1 0- ROBERT WHAT? 
2 A. SFADE. 
2 Q. ROBERT WHAT? 
4 A. SPAN. 
5 Q. SPAN? 
6 A. I CAN'T SPELL THE LAST NAME. I TON'T KNOW. 
7 I HAVE TROUBLE -- KIND OF. 
8 Q. WHY DON'T YOU LOOK AT THAT EXHIBIT IN FRONT 
9 OF YOU, EXHIBIT ONE. OKAY. NOW, LOOKING AT THAT 
10 EXHIBIT? 
11 A. SPUD. 
12 Q. WHAT? 
13 A. SPUD. 
14 Q. AND YOU HAVE LOOKED AT IT NOW, AND COULD YCV 
15 SPELL THAT NAME WITHOUT LOOKING AT IT AGAIN? 
16 A. I CAN'T SPELL IT. 
17 Q. WHAT'S DOES IT START WITH? 
18 A. S. 
IS Q. WHAT DOES IT END WITH? 
20 A. E. 
21 Q. WHAT'S THE LETTERS IN BETWEEN? 
22 A. S. ~ S. E. — S. R. O U P. T. 
23 Q. NOW, YOU ADMIT YOU TRIED TO FORGE A CHECK; 
24 RIGHT? 























Q. AND YOU WERE PROMISED YOU WOULDN'T GO TO 
JAIL, RIGHT, IF YOU CAME AND TESTIFIED AGAINST TO!:? 
A. IF I WHAT? -- I DON'T GET IT. 
Q. WEREN'T THERE PROMISES MADE TO YOU? 
A. NO. 
Q. NO? HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH THE CRIME? 
HAVE YOU HAD TO GO TO THE DETENTION CENTER? 
A. NO. OH, YES, ONCE. 
THAT WAS RIGHT AFTER YOU WERE ARRESTED; Q-
A. A FEW WEEKS -- ABOUT A WEEK LATER. 
Q. ABOUT A WEEK LATER YOU WENT TO COURT; RIGHT? 
A. YES. 
A. WELL, IT'S NOT REALLY COURT. IT WAS --
Q. YOU WENT AND MET WITH POLICE OFFICERS? 
A. I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS A POLICE OFFICER. 
Q. PROBATION OFFICER? FROM THE JUVENILE SYSTEM? 
A. I THINK THAT'S WHAT IT WAS. 
Q. DID THEY PROMISE YOU THAT IF YOU TESTIFIED 
AGAINST TOM, THEY WOULDN'T PRESS ANY CHARGES AGAINST YOU? 
A. NO. NO, THEY DIDN'T. 
Q. HAVE THEY PRESSED CHARGES AGAINST YOU? 
MR. MORGAN: WE ARE PROCEEDING IN BAD FAITH. 
AT THIS POINT ALL OF THAT HAS BEEN ANSWERED .. 
MR. GRINDSTAFF: I DON'T BELIEVE HE'S ANSWERED 
44 
1 THAT QUESTION. 
2 THE COURT: HE CAN ANSWER THAT QUESTIOI\. 
2 THE WITNESS: WILL YOU REPEAT IT?. 
4 Q. HAVE THERE BEEN CHARGES FRESSED AGAINST YOU' 
5 A. UM, NO. 
6 Q. NO. AND WHY HAVEN'T THERE BEEN CHARGES 
7 PRESSED AGAINST YOU?. 
8 MR. MORGAN: OBJECTION. BEYOND THE PERSONAL 
9 KNOWLEDGE OF THE WITNESS. AS PHRASED. 
10 THE COURT: YOU CAN ANSWER THE QUESTION, IF YOU 
11 KNOW. 
12 THE WITNESS: I DON'T KNOW.. 
12 Q. YOU DON'T KNOW WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAVE!:' T BE 
14 CHARGED BECAUSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE? 
15 A. YES. I DON'T KNOW.. 
16 Q. YOU DON'T KNOW. YOUR WERE IN COURT FOR A 
17 PRELIMINARY HEARING, WEREN'T YOU? AND DIDN'T YOU HEAR 
18 THE PROSECUTOR REFRESENT TO YOU THAT THEY WOULD NOT FILE 
19 CHARGES AGAINST YOU? FOR YOUR TESTIMONY? 
20 A. I CAN'T REMEMBER. 
21 Q. ISN'T THAT WHAT HAPPENED? 
22 MR. MORGAN: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. MAY WE 
23 APPROACH THE BENCH? 
24 THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
25 {BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE 
45 
< r ^ ' fijta^c*—! 
RECORD.).. 
Q. {BY MR. GRINDSTAFF) NOW, HAVE YOU BEEN TOLD 
THAT IF YOU DIDN'T TESTIMONY THAT YOU WOULD GO TO JAIL? 
A. NO. 
Q. NO? ABOUT A MONTH AND A HALF AGO, WASN'T IT 
TRUE THAT YOU AND YOUR SISTER SAT IN A ROOM WITH A POLICE 
OFFICER AND YOU TWO WERE TOLD THAT IF YOU DIDN'T COME 
OVE? AND TESTIFY AGAINST TOM — 
MR. MORGAN: OBJECTION. THIS IS GETTING 
ARGUMENTATIVE AND -- I MEAN, HE'S ASKED — EACH TIME THE 
TIE WITNESS HAS ANSWERED EACH TIME THAT HE HAS NOT BFEN 
OFFERED ANYTHING IN THIS CASE. NOW WE ARE GOING THROUGH 
TESTIMONY, I THINK, THAT IS GOING WAY COLLATERAL TO AIT 
IrS"-S KEFE. 
THE COURT: WELL, I'M GOING TO OVERRULE THE 
"•P-E-T^ ,' 0" T-r PRESUMPTION THAT A THE QUESTION IS ASKED 
-- G";?r FATTH. 
w:,,!5"?^ 0" THE JURY. Y~U ?EME"BER WHEN THE JURY 
cs-cr-^rv
 p p r r r S S UAS GOING Oil, AND I INDICATED TO YOU 
T-AT WHAT COUNSEL SAYS IS NOT EVIDENCE. THE OT*Lv 
FV7--MT
 I ? ;juAT WITNESSES SAY. THE MERE FACT TKA"* * 
2UESTICN IS AS^ED IN SUCK A WAY THAT IT MAY SOUND LTF A 
STATEJisir FRO:: COUNSEL, I S THAT IS NOT EVIDENCE, AND r 
CAUTION YOU TO CONSIDER THAT AS WE PROCEED. 
THE OBJECTION IS OVERRULED. YOU KAY PROCEED. 
4S 
1 Q. (BY MR. GRIKDSTAFF) DO YOV PFM^ '-'F-? T-F 
2 QUESTION? 
3 A. YES, I DO? 
4 A. NO.. 
5 Q. NO? 
6 A. DID YOU SIT IN THE ROOM WITH YOUP. SI STEP A"? 
7 POLICE OFFICERS? 
8 A. NO. 
9 Q. YOU NEVER SAT WITH ANY KIND OF POLICE 
10 INVESTIGATOR WITH YOUR SISTER? 
11 A. NO, I DIDN'T. 
12 Q. THIS V7AS BEFORE PRELIMINARY HEARING? 
13 APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AGO, YOU NEVER SAT— 
14 A. NO, I DIDN'T. 
15 Q. SO IF YOUR SISTER CAME IN AND TESTIFIED 
16 DIFFERENTLY, THAT WOULDN'T BE TRUE? 
17 A. NO. 
18 Q. NOW, YOU MENTIONED THAT TOM SAID THAT YOU 
19 WEREN'T SUPPOSED TO MENTION HIS NAME. 
20 A. YES. 
21 Q. YOU SAID THAT HE IMMEDIATELY TOLD YOU, DON'T 
22 MENTION HIS NAME WHEN YOU CASH THE CHECK. WHEN YOU CASH 
23 A CHECK, WHY WOULD YOU MENTION HIS NAME? 
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